Rethinking National Energy Policy: Japan's Looming Electricity Crisis, Nuclear Power, and the Fate of TEPCO in 2011-2012

Rethinking National Energy Policy Japan’s Electricity Crisis, Nuclear Power, and the Fate of TEPCO EARTHQUAKE 11.3.2011 – 14:45 (PT) 8.9 MAGNITUDE Miyagi Prefecture TOKYO earthquake epicenter damaged nuclear power plant May 27, 2011 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies scalise@tuj.ac.jp Japan Political Economy 4 Categories of Risk Operational: includes infrastructure, geography, and security • • • • Disruptions to grid system, transportation, and power supply Social unrest and local opposition Security threats to fuel supply Government responses to natural disaster damage Commercial & Economic: includes policy decisions, external shocks, regulations, taxes, property rights, and contracts • • • • • • Tariff changes Environmental regulations Domestic market obligations Property rights Commodity price shocks Subsidies Societal: includes changes in social and labor structures and behaviors • • • • TEPCO labor relations & strikes US-Japan relationship Reputational risk and social responsibility Public attitude towards clean vs. conventional energy Political: includes manifestos and public speeches • • • • • Regime stability Resource nationalism Candidate attitudes to sector Regulatory actions Country-level reputational risk Slide 2 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Spillover effects (next 5 years?) • Impact on privately-owned power companies, especially TEPCO • Impact on energy market (e.g., prices, profits, productivity, and resource allocation) • Impact on Japan’s energy policy • Impact on NIMBY politics • Impact on global supply-chain • Impact on Japanese politics • Impact on US-Japan relations Dr. Paul J. Scalise Slide 3 Japan Political Economy Operational Risk Japan’s looming electricity crisis Slide 4 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Conventional Wisdom: Japan Will Be OK? Characteristics of the 2 Earthquake Epicentres Miyagi Hyogo 2011 Population (% of national total) Population over 64 (% of prefecture total) GDP (% of total) Agriculture, forestry and fisheries (% of total) Manufacturing (% of total) Containerized shipping (000 TEU) Earthquake magnitude Loss of life Damage (trillion ¥) (% of GDP) Note: TEU = twenty-foot equivalent unit Sources: Prefectural GDP from Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office; shipping data from “List of world's busiest container ports”: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_world's_busiest_container_ports. Courtesy of Arthur Alexander and Oxford Analytica. 1995 4.3 19.8 3.7 1.7 4.3 2,200 7.3 6,400 10 2 1.8 26.9 1.6 2.4 1.1 105 8.9 20,000+ 24? 4.0? Slide 5 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Not just Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima Tohoku Electric Power Co. • Residential: • Industrial: 6,782,929 904,649 Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) • Residential: • Industrial: • Prefectures: • % GDP: 36.5 • Sq miles (km): 15,254 (39,510) 26,405,866 2,193,087 8 • Prefectures: 7 • % GDP: 7.8 • Sq miles (km): 30,708 (79,534) Total Customers: 36,286,531 Total Prefectures: 15 Sources: Company data, Paul J. Scalise Total Sq. Miles: 45,962 Total % GDP: 44.3 Slide 6 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Context: TEPCO Historically Stable • Blackouts few and modest in postwar Japan • Effectively used by incumbents to maintain stable costumer base • Effective strategy against new entrants in post2000 contestable electric power market Average duration of forced outages (min) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 TEPCO USA UK France Sources: TEPCO: Company data. USA: “SAIDI” (System Average Interruption Duration Index) average duration of 5 US electric power companies—Consolidated Edison, Florida Power & Light, NStar (former Boston Edison), Pacific Gas & Electric, and Southern California Edison. UK: “Ofgem Report on Distribution and Transmission Performance.” France: “EDF Annual Report.” Slide 7 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Now a Crisis: Not Just Fukushima Dai-ichi Hydro Coal LNG Oil Nuclear Renewables • 70,000 Installed Capacity (MW) 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 TEPCO (pre) TEPCO (post) Tohoku (pre) Tohoku (post) • • • • Sources: Company data, Paul J. Scalise • 13 of TEPCO’s 17 nuclear reactors offline (12,396 MW) All 4 Tohoku nuclear reactors offline (3,274 MW) 10 of TEPCO’s 20 oilfired thermal plants offline (7,100 MW) Both of TEPCO’s coalfired thermal plants offline (1,600 MW) All 4 of Tohoku’s coalfired thermal plants offline (3,200 MW) 1 of Tohoku’s 9 LNGfired thermal plants offline (600 MW) Slide 8 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy TEPCO Reserve Margins (1965-2011) 26 21 Reserve Margin (%) 16 11 6 1 -4 -9 -14 -19 1965 1980 1995 2010 2025 • • Optimal reserve margin: 15-20% Peak demand in August underestimated Protracted leadtimes in siting new build Worst-case: planned and unplanned blackouts in August 2011 ? ?? ? ? • • Note: Reserve margin is the amount of unused available capability of an electric power system at peak demand, or peak load, measured in megawatts (MW) for a utility system as a percentage of total capability. Sources: Company data, Paul J. Scalise Slide 9 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Allocation Inefficiencies Electric Power Company Installed Capacity Electricity Sales (% Sales Total) Hokkaido 7GW 34.3GWh (11%) 0.6 GW • 2 incompatible hertz systems (60 Hz v 50 Hz) JEPX cannot overcome it Self-generation (21,681 MW) inaccessible? New entrants minor players Can quick build overcome environmental regulations? Transfer (GW) Hokuriku 8GW 43.3GWh (4%) 0.3 GW • • Tohoku 16GW 106GWh (11%) 2.2 GW Chugoku KEPCO 12GW 61.3GWh 2.6 GW 34GW 129.4GWh (4%) (14%) 2.2 GW 2.2 GW Kyushu 20GW 104.2GWh (11%) Chubu 33GW Shikoku 119.8GWh 7GW 44.4GWh (12%) (4%) 1.5 GW TEPCO 64GW 273.7GWh (29%) 1 GW • • 60Hz 114GW 50Hz 87GW Note: GW=gigawatt (1,000 MW); 'Normal GW' and 'Rated GW' refer to the total number of gigawatts and their total market shares. Sources: Denki Jigyō Binran, METI, calculations by Paul J. Scalise Slide 10 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Conventional Power Also Hurt • WORST-CASE (PEAK DEMAND) BASE-CASE (PEAK DEMAND) BEST-CASE (PEAK DEMAND) 65,000 Installed capacity (MW) 60,000 55,000 50,000 45,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 • • ) cy 3 ) 6 ) ) d) ne se on (1) (1) er y d) ne ( ge f fli age ff li icien no , 5, rcha rati ka ild cov pa a O u O o 3 o a f C a Dam ar ( D am al ( Inef H ir (2, Pu est hin w b R e e ( le l ( rm e u R t ac N e ion k a ub a e at ct ua ar uc Hi him C h -q ucle N erm Th n R pe e as K Pr N Ins Th tio za ili Ut y ci t • • • Sources: Company data, Paul J. Scalise Environmental regulation constraints on new build 1GW only from Chubu Electric Some damaged thermal plants hopefully back online Mothballed plants restored Barely sufficient in best-case scenario Expect blackouts in summer with basecase and worst-case scenarios Slide 11 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Factors of Operation Affected by Disaster Number likely to rise significantly by summer Evacuation directive from nuclear power plant Flood Stagnant supply Blackout, power failure Damaged production line Damaged lifeline and infrastructure Building destruction 18 20 66 88 194 208 529 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Survey sample: 1597 firms. Source: Tokyo Shoko Research (as of 16 March 2011). Courtesy of Naomi Fink, Japan Strategist, Jefferies Equity Research Asia, 28 March, 2011. • • • Worst-case: TEPCO misjudges both peak demand and its ability to acquire supply before year-end. Planned and unplanned blackouts ensue until year-end. Base-case: TEPCO forecasts of supply and demand are correct. Rolling blackouts would be limited to the summer, but short-timed. Best-case: TEPCO is too cautious in its estimates. Rolling blackouts are avoidable past late-April 2011. Slide 12 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Societal Risk Why civil unrest rarely happens Slide 13 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Management-labor relations • • • • • • “Spring offensive” Relatively low “efficiency wages” Low executive compensation costs Life-time employment Media image of stability Blue-chip brand name Slide 14 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Commercial & Economic Risk Can Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) Survive? Slide 15 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy TEPCO: Nationalization, Bankruptcy or Neither? Extensive operating risks Non-core business growth sluggish and unprofitable Will tariff rate increases be sufficient? Unclear electricity demand New business investment? Damaged supply Interest payments on debt Cash flow negative? Maintenance capex 2011 Dividend payouts discontinued TEPCO Share Price (¥) 90 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 Sep-73 Sep-78 Sep-83 Sep-88 Sep-93 Sep-98 Sep-03 Sep-08 Enron Share Price ($) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 12/24/1982 2/26/1988 4/30/1993 7/3/1998 nuclear damage liability? Liberalization? national energy policy? Insurance payments? Public opinion on energy issues Party support Cabinet approval ratings Regulatory uncertainty Slide 16 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Negative public opinion? Japan Political Economy TEPCO: Segment Analysis Industry % of sales Electric Power Supply Business Information and Communications Business Energy and Environment Business (Other) Eliminations Overseas Operations Living Environment and Lifestyle-related Business Industry % of EBIT Electric Power Supply Business Information and Communications Business Energy and Environment Business (Other) Eliminations Overseas Operations Living Environment and Lifestyle-related Business Industry % of Assets Electric Power Supply Business Information and Communications Business Energy and Environment Business (Other) Eliminations Overseas Operations Living Environment and Lifestyle-related Business Sources: Company data, Paul J. Scalise 2001 98.3 2003 97.3 2005 93.2 2007 94.3 2009 94.4 2010 93.7 2011 94.3 2012 94.4 1.4 1.8 4.8 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.6 7.3 -7.0 0.0 7.7 -6.8 0.0 6.2 -7.1 0.3 6.8 -6.4 0.4 7.1 -6.3 0.3 7.1 -5.5 0.3 6.5 -4.6 0.3 6.5 -4.3 0.2 0.0 2001 0.0 2003 100. 5 2.6 2005 2.5 2007 2.7 2009 2.5 2010 1.9 2011 1.6 2012 115. 5 96.9 99.4 69.2 86.5 88.8 875.4 204.7 548.0 -10.1 -12.6 -0.2 -3.7 -6.7 4.7 2.3 2.3 -4.1 3.0 0.2 0.0 2.9 0.3 0.0 4.9 0.5 0.1 13.0 0.9 3.2 7.6 0.2 -0.8 5.7 0.1 0.0 -11.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.0 2001 95.6 0.0 2003 94.6 1.9 2005 93.1 9.1 2007 92.8 4.3 2009 92.8 3.1 2010 92.2 0.0 2011 91.8 0.0 2012 91.1 0.9 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 • Electricity: core • Little diversification • Unprofitable noncore businesses • Overseas ↓? • Poor return on assets (ROA) • Poor growth 4.7 -1.2 0.0 6.2 -1.7 0.0 3.7 -1.8 1.2 4.2 -2.0 1.6 4.4 -2.5 1.8 5.6 -2.4 1.5 6.4 -2.6 1.7 7.7 -2.7 1.7 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 1.9 1.6 Slide 17 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy TEPCO: Cashflow Analysis (incl. pro forma) • Declining cash generation • Increased borrowing • Threatened dividend payouts • Borrowing rate to rise? • Will capital expenditures fall? • Role of new entrants? CASH FLOW (¥ billion) 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2012 Cash generated Investing cash outflows 1,464 1,148 936 510 988 477 331 (918) (699) (650) (731) (686) (724) (736) Free cash 1 Total proceeds from asset sales 546 448 286 (221) 302 (247) (406) 12 (12) 34 45 87 100 - Free cash 2 559 436 320 (176) 389 (147) (406) Dividends paid (81) (81) (81) (101) (81) - - Borrowings (480) (369) (269) 290 (420) 1,231 (973) Other finance Net finance cashflow Net incr / (decr) in cash 3 (1) (0) (1) 6 (116) (139) (477) (370) (269) 289 (414) 1,115 (1,112) 1 (15) (30) 12 (106) 967 (1,518) Sources: Company data, Paul J. Scalise Slide 18 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy TEPCO Tariff Rates (2010) • 16% proposed tariff hike • 25% increase better • Fuel costs expected to increase tariffs • Will TEPCO pass extraordinary losses to consumers? Retail Electricity Prices in Selected Countries 0.25 Industrial Residential 0.2 Cents per kWh 0.15 0.1 0.05 0 Japan Korea Sweden UK USA France Sources: Key World Energy Statistics, International Energy Agency (2010) Slide 19 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy TEPCO Shareholders (%, 1965-2009) G Fi na nc i ov er nm al I Se cu rit ns tit O ie s & th er Co rp Fo In di or re vi at ig du io ne ns al rs s en t ut io ns Br ok er s 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 41.5 45.7 50.7 45.0 37.0 36.4 34.3 37.8 35.9 6.7 0.2 1.9 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.9 7.3 8.2 10.3 9.9 5.9 5.5 5.6 4.7 4.8 2.7 0.7 4.4 6.1 16.0 20.5 19.3 17.4 17.5 37.8 41.5 29.3 35.0 36.5 33.0 36.6 36.0 37.8 • Individuals largest • Foreign investment ↑ • Volume trading ↑ Sources: Company data, Paul J. Scalise Slide 20 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Spillover: Is nuclear power still viable? On schedule (siting/const) Planning suspended Construction suspended Offline Ohma No. 1 (EPDC) Higashidori No. 2 (Tohoku) Higashidori Nos. 1-2 (TEPCO) Higashidori No. 1 (Tohoku) Mihama Nos. 1-4 (KEPCO) Onagawa Nos. 1-3 (Tohoku) Fukushima Dai-ichi Nos. 7-8 (TEPCO) Fukushima Dai-ichi Nos. 1-6 (TEPCO) Fukushima Dai-ni Nos.1-4 (TEPCO) Hamaoka No. 6 (Chubu) Tomari No. 3 (Hokkaido) • • • • • • • Takahama Nos. 1-4 (KEPCO) Shimane No. 3 (Chugoku) Genkai Nos. 12 (Kyushu) Kaminoseki Nos. 1-2 (Chugoku) • Sendai No. 3 (Kyushu) Currently, 54 operational reactors at 17 sites (stations) in 13 prefectures. Okinawa EPCO only utility without nuclear Permanent shutdown (pre-3/11): 5 Long-term shutdown (pre-3/11): 1 Currently, 30% of total EPCO generation. METI target by 2030: 50%. Useful life: 30 to 40 years. 35% reaching their end now. 2 under construction; 12 in planning stages. Will NIMBY sentiments outweigh practical economic considerations? Slide 21 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy METI’s Growing Dilemma Generation cost by type vs. oil price, 1951-2009 18 16 14 (Yen per kWh) 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 Crude oil price ($/barrel) Hydro (lhs) Thermal (lhs) Nuclear (lhs) 100 90 80 $/barrel 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 So urce: TEP CO financial data fo r generatio n/kWh, Energy Data and M o delling Center fo r histo rical o il prices. No te: To tal average generatio n co st is derived fro m the to tal generatio n expenses per kWh generated by fuel so urce. Japan's NPS Construction Costs (1970-2011) ¥600,000 ¥500,000 (Yen per kW) ¥400,000 ¥300,000 ¥200,000 ¥100,000 ¥600,000 ¥500,000 ¥400,000 ¥300,000 ¥200,000 ¥100,000 (Millions) y = 4871 + 1 .5x 02738 R 2 = 0.5264 ¥0 ¥0 1970 1976 1979 1985 1993 1997 2010 So urce: Denryo ku shinsetsubi yo ran (vario us years) • Thermal power competitiveness? • LNG competitive advantage • Load factors: 85% ↑ • Subsidies difficult • NIMBY • Negative media image? Slide 22 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Spillover: Can renewables now succeed? Renewable energy locations Under construction Planning stage • • • • • • • Notes: DPJ=Democratic Party of Japan; LDP=Liberal Democratic Party • Currently, 2,015 MW (0.71%) of total capacity in Japan. More off-grid (2,000 MW) than on-grid (12 MW) capacity. Varied technologies with range of applications On-grid projects were uneconomical without substantial subsidies No DPJ or MOF subsidy support METI supports nuclear power only Pre-3/11 slated additional 100 MW in solar/wind projects Will crises change the dynamic? Slide 23 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Estimated FY2011 New Entrant Costs Construction Costs per Kilowatt by Generation Type ¥800,000 ¥700,000 ¥600,000 ¥500,000 ¥400,000 ¥300,000 ¥200,000 ¥100,000 ¥0 Hydro Geothermal LNG Oil Coal Nuclear Sources: Company data, trade press, Paul J. Scalise Item Source Oil LNG Coal ¥724,808 ¥415,277 ¥339,752 ¥213,354 ¥368,748 ¥334,067 • • • • • Capital cost per kW (¥1,000) Pre-tax nominal WACC (%) Plant life (years) Fuel price (¥/net kWh) Load factor (%) Tax rate Required post-tax ROI (%) Avg. reported projects (A) (B) Japan standard © Includes thermal efficiency © Assumed © Japan standard Calculated from assumption 415.3 2 20 11.3 45 39.5 1.7 222.6 349.4 7.8 1.5 Components of new entrant pricing Required ROI (%) Fixed costs Variable costs Total costs Estimated new entrant tariff Source: Paul Scalise estimates F=Computed from above data G=Personnel+depreciation+rent H=Fuel+operations+variable mantenance I=G+H I+F 1.7 6.7 11.3 17.9 19.6 3.6 7.8 11.4 13.1 5.6 1.5 7.1 8.8 • • • Oil: ¥19.6/kWh↑? LNG: ¥ 13.1/kWh↑? Coal: ¥ 8.8/kWh↑? Renewable generation costs ↓? Transmission and distribution costs the same. Wind: ¥14/kWh Solar: ¥30~45/kWh Geo-thermal: ¥10 Slide 24 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Renewables: strengths and weaknesses • Generation costs are slowly becoming competitive with conventional power • Rising fossil fuel prices helps renewables • But… • Wind: avian dangers, questionable topography • Geo-thermal: best sites in national parks • Hydro: best sites already captured • Solar: On-grid versus off-grid costs Dr. Paul J. Scalise Slide 25 Japan Political Economy Political Risk Whither the Kan Cabinet and the Democratic Party of Japan? Slide 26 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Spillover: Can the DPJ really lead? • 60 50 Party Support (%) • • • LDP DPJ 40 30 20 10 0 200320042005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 • • Notes: DPJ=Democratic Party of Japan; LDP=Liberal Democratic Party Sources: Nikkei Shimbun, Paul J. Scalise Both major parties lack mandate DPJ now falls below LDP in support Lack of leadership, stability, and ideas DPJ and Kan Cabinet waffle on national energy policy Renewables or nuclear or back to conventional power? Whither DPJ Greenhouse Gas Emissions pledge? Slide 27 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Conclusions • • • • • • • • • • • • • Conventional wisdom might be wrong Crisis and blackouts might cost Japan $65-$125bn in 2011 (Barclays Capital) Industries impacted: mining, storage facility services, railways, pulp/paper, steel, chemicals, breweries, computer chips, autos, auto-parts, semiconductors. Companies: Asahi Beer, Nissan, Renesas, Toyota, Tokyo Steel Quarterly GDP figures likely revised downward in 2011 TEPCO bankruptcy risk minimal Expect deteriorating returns in 2011-2015. Electricity prices will rise. Nuclear power likely to remain stable Renewables to achieve marginal on-grid growth Alternatives energy options bleak Japan’s future to be decided in committee Kan Cabinet is living on borrowed time Slide 28 Dr. Paul J. Scalise Japan Political Economy Paul J. Scalise (D.Phil., Oxford, 2009) is Non-Resident Fellow at the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University, Japan Campus, and Contributing Analyst to Oxford Analytica, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), and Eurasia Group. Starting in September 2011, he will take up the post of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Fellow at the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. Dr. Scalise spent several years with such financial institutions as Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein Japan Ltd. and UBS Global Asset Management as a Tokyo-based research analyst of Japanese energy and transportation companies, having been ranked by investors Greenwich Survey’s number one Japanese utilities analyst in 2001 among all UK financial institutions, 3rd for Euro zone. His forthcoming book Agendas and Uncertainty: Japan’s Electric Power Restructuring in a Neoliberal World is based on his doctoral dissertation. Grants, scholarships, and fellowships from the Toshiba International Foundation, the Japan Foundation Endowment Committee, the Social Science Research Council and elsewhere have generously supported his work. Dr. Scalise’s articles have appeared in more than six languages in numerous publications, including Newsweek, Foreign Policy, Asian Wall Street Journal, International Herald Tribune, Asahi Evening News, World & I, The Oriental Economist, Japan Forum, and other scholarly journals and book chapters. He authored the article on Japan’s national energy policy in The Encyclopaedia of Energy (Elsevier Academic Press 2004). He holds a bachelor’s degree in political science, cum laude, from Marist College, a master’s degree in Japan Studies and International Economics from the Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a doctorate in Comparative Political Economy from the University of Oxford. Among his professional activities, he served as professorial lecturer at Sophia University in Tokyo, Japan, and Senior Associate at C a m b r i dge Energy Research Associates in Boston, USA. Contact Information: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies Temple University, Japan Campus Minato-ku Minami-Azabu 2-8-12 Tokyo 106-0047 Location: www.tuj.ac.jp/maps (English) Mobile tel: +1 (732) 814-1612 ICJS home page: http://www.tuj.ac.jp/icas/index.html Upcoming events: http://www.tuj.ac.jp/events/index.html personal page: http://www.tuj.ac.jp/icas/fellows.html e-mail: scalise@tuj.ac.jp Slide 29 Dr. Paul J. Scalise
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